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earlyLinux eBPF and Windows ETW sensors merged

Endpoint security that behaves like a living organism.

Synthaea is an open-source XDR with on-device ML detection, case-based correlation, and a metamorphic agent that defends itself. Open, without handing attackers a map.

  • Apache-2.0
  • No CLA
  • Windows · Linux · macOS
verdict → blockeBPF sensorETW sensorcase · 3 hosts

The gap

Open-source security sees everything. It defends almost nothing.

Excellent telemetry, excellent rule engines, and essentially nothing else. On-device ML and agent self-protection are empty across the field: commercial vendors treat both as crown jewels and ship them only as closed binaries.

Capabilities of open-source endpoint security tools compared with Synthaea's goals
ToolTelemetryRule detectionResponseOn-device MLAgent self-protection
OSQuery————
Velociraptorhunt-timepartial——
Wazuhpartial——
FalcoLinuxpartial——
Sysmon + Sigma———
Synthaea (goal)inline

The thesis

ML detection and metamorphism are two halves of one argument.

A rule engine is public and static. Download the rules and the binary, and you can work out offline what the defender sees and how to blind it. Synthaea makes both attacks expensive, independently.

Adaptive immunity

A learned model raises the cost of evasion.

A rule enumerates conditions; a model interpolates between them, flagging variants nobody wrote a rule for. Weights ship open. The part an attacker can't reproduce is fleet-derived: rarity and per-tenant baselines from your own data.

Unique DNA per install

A per-install-unique agent raises the cost of blinding.

Analysis of one installation does not transfer to the next. There is no stable process name, service name, file path, byte pattern or function offset to hardcode into a killer.

Randomization, not obscurity.

The mechanism is published; what differs per install is a small, rotatable seed, the way ASLR, stack canaries and password salts work. The rule that settles it: no capability depends on the secrecy of code or design, and base capability survives total disclosure of every key.

Product

A sensor on every endpoint. One case per intrusion.

Every capability is labelled with where it stands today. Anything without code behind it is a design goal.

Linux + Windows in code

Kernel-level sensors

eBPF on Linux, ETW on Windows, EndpointSecurity on macOS: each platform a module behind one formal sensor contract. No reference platform.

In code

Rules you can read

A rule engine mapped to ATT&CK techniques such as T1055, T1059, T1071 and T1105. Public, reviewable, exportable.

In code

On-device ML

ONNX inference on the endpoint, plus temporal correlation scored with Isolation Forest and Bayesian log-likelihood ratios.

Design goal

Cases, not alerts

Detections become evidence, correlated into one object per campaign across hosts, users and time. The machine does the correlation, not the analyst.

Design goal

Inline response

Block, kill or quarantine on the endpoint, and drive response across identity, network, email and cloud, scoped to the case.

Design goal

A metamorphic agent

Per-tenant builds with no stable process name, service, path, byte pattern or offset to hardcode into a killer. Integrity, watchdog, anti-tamper.

How it works

From kernel event to contained case.

  1. 01

    Sense

    eBPF · ETW · EndpointSecurity

    Kernel events flow through a ring buffer into a normalizer, then into a bounded process graph on the endpoint.

  2. 02

    Judge

    Rules · ML T0–T2 · correlation

    Rules, on-device models and local correlation reach a verdict where the activity happens, not minutes later in a SIEM.

  3. 03

    Respond

    block · kill · quarantine

    The verdict acts inline, while the morph runtime watches the agent itself for tampering.

  4. 04

    Correlate

    mTLS · store-and-forward

    The control plane folds detections into cases alongside identity, network, email and cloud signals, and drives the response.

case · one campaign
open

Contain this case

  • Isolate the 3 affected hosts
  • Revoke the compromised identity's sessions
  • Block the 2 command-and-control domains
  • Quarantine the 4 dropped files
  • Remove the malicious mailbox rule
Illustrative example from the design specification. The unit of work is a case, not an alert.

An honest word

Metamorphism won't stop a determined kernel adversary.

Against SYSTEM or root with a vulnerable signed driver, no user-mode technique wins. What it does defeat is worth a great deal: commodity killers with hardcoded names, offline reverse engineering that transfers across a fleet, and signature-based agent identification during reconnaissance.

The real defense against a kernel adversary is kernel-level (PPL/ELAM, SIP, LSM) plus a server-side heartbeat, because agent silence is itself a detection.

Scope

What we are not building.

  • Not a SIEM.We export to yours.
  • Not an AV product first.Static scanning serves behavioral detection.
  • Not a payload-mutation engine.Metamorphism means the agent diversifies itself, nothing else.
  • Not vulnerability management, patching or DLP.
  • Not container runtime security.Falco owns that.

Status

Where it stands.

Early implementation. The specification is the authoritative design reference; the code is catching up to it.

Merged
  • Linux eBPF sensor
  • Windows ETW sensor, 4 correlation rules validated on real telemetry
  • Rule engine and temporal correlator
  • ML scoring and ONNX inference wrapper
  • Stable sensor contract, event schema and CI
Not yet built
  • Control plane
  • Morph engine
  • Case-correlation layer

Watch it grow.

Most of Synthaea is still at the design stage: the best time to argue about the foundations. Follow the build as it happens.

Apache-2.0 throughout · eBPF probes GPLv2 (a kernel constraint) · DCO, no CLA